Senior AI Engineer · Red Hat · Ireland
Raymond Mc Creesh
Platform security · AI infrastructure
Writing on Linux platform security — TPM 2.0, measured boot, Secure Boot — and on running AI workloads on real infrastructure.
Writing
2 posts-
Seal to the Signer, Not the State
Why binding a TPM policy to exact PCR values breaks on every kernel update, and how UKIs, PCR 11 and PolicyAuthorize let the TPM trust a signing authority instead.
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What a TPM Actually Does, and How Linux Uses It to Protect Disk Unlock
How TPM 2.0, LUKS2, PCRs and measured boot work together to unlock encrypted Linux systems without storing the unlock secret on disk.
Series · Linux Boot Security
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Part 1 · What a TPM Actually Does, and How Linux Uses It to Protect Disk Unlock →
How TPM 2.0, LUKS2, PCRs and measured boot work together to unlock encrypted Linux systems without storing the unlock secret on disk.
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Part 2 · Seal to the Signer, Not the State →
Why binding a TPM policy to exact PCR values breaks on every kernel update, and how UKIs, PCR 11 and PolicyAuthorize let the TPM trust a signing authority instead.